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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. on March 28, 2008.' The case had triggered discussion
in the United States and in other jurisdictions, including Canada, about the
central issue: whether parties to an arbitration agreement can contractually vary
the statutory grounds for judicial review of an arbitral award and, if so, to what
extent.
In Hall Street, the agreement for a domestic arbitration provided broader
grounds of judicial review than are specified in the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).' The agreement stated that the district court shall vacate, modify or
correct the arbitration award where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are
incorrect.
The main question posed to the court was whether parties can
contractually expand the grounds forjudicial review of their arbitral award. In
other words, is a U.S. court barred from enforcing an arbitration agreement that
provides for more expansive grounds ofjudicial review than are specified in the
FAA?
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I. See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc.,170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008).
2. Federal Arbitration Act § 11,9 U.S.C.A. §§ 10-11 (1947).
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The Supreme Court held that if parties to an arbitration agreement want to
make use of the expedited review of awards contemplated by the FAA, they
cannot modify the grounds for judicial review by agreement.
The issue of varying statutory grounds of review has been the subject of
limited Canadian judicial consideration and only in the context of whether
parties can contract those grounds.
II. OVERVIEW OF HALL STREET
Hall Street involved a dispute between a landlord and tenant. The
landlord, Hall Street, leased property to Mattel. The property had been used by
Mattel and its predecessors as a toy manufacturing facility. It was undisputed
that the well water on the property, used for drinking and bathing, was
contaminated and that Mattel and its predecessors, in contravention of the
Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (ODWQA),3 did not test the well water for
contaminates. Hall Street commenced an action claiming that Mattel was
required to indemnify it from all actions by any parties in relation to the
condition of the property. Under a settlement agreement, the parties decided
to arbitrate, and the agreement specifically stated that the district court "shall
vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of facts
are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's
conclusions of law are erroneous."4 The District Court approved and adopted
the agreement as an order.
The arbitrator found that despite Mattel's violation of the ODWQA, it had
not violated any "applicable environmental laws." Under the lease, a violation
of applicable environmental laws would result in the landlord gaining broad
indemnification rights. The arbitrator found that because the ODWQA was not
designed to protect either human health, or landowners' property from
environmental contamination, it was not an applicable environmental law.
Therefore, the arbitrator concluded that Mattel was exempt from the
indemnification requirements of the lease.
The district court, in remanding the case back to the arbitrator, granted
Hall Street's motion to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the
arbitrator's conclusion that the ODWQA was not an applicable environmental
law was wrong. The arbitrator then reversed his decision in favor of Hall
Street. On judicial review, the district court upheld the arbitrator's amended
decision. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit followed its en banc decision in Kyocera
3. See Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (ODWQA), OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
448.119-448.285, 454.235, 454.255 (2007).




Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc.5 and reversed the district court's
initial vacation of the arbitrator's initial erroneous award holding that "the
terms of an arbitration agreement controlling the [grounds] of judicial review
[is] unenforceable and severable."6 On remand to the district court, the court
held that an arbitrator exceeds his powers within the meaning of the FAA when
the award is based on an implausible interpretation of a contract, as was the
arbitrator's interpretation that the ODWQA was not an applicable
environmental law. It again vacated the original arbitration award. Mattel
appealed to the Ninth Circuit again and the court reversed the district court's
decision by holding that "[i]mplausibility is not a valid ground for avoiding an
arbitration award."7
The district courts have been split on this issue. The Ninth and Tenth
Circuit Courts have held that the FAA sets the exclusive standard by which an
arbitrator's decision maybe reviewed;8 other district courts, however, have held
that parties may contractually expand the grounds for judicial review9 or may
supplant the review set out in the FAA with clear contractual language.'0
The importance of the issue attracted a number of intervenors to the
appeal. In support of the petitioner, the Wireless Association submitted that
arbitration agreements as drafted by the parties should be enforced; otherwise,
Congress's intention to encourage parties to arbitrate would be undermined.
The New England Legal Foundation and the National Federation of
Independent Business Legal Foundation intervened jointly, advancing the
position that the FAA provides a default standard ofjudicial review upon which
the parties may expand, that contractual freedom would reduce the burden on
courts, and foster reliance on arbitration. In addition, the Pacific Legal
Foundation advocated that the FAA was designed to encourage freedom of
choice and that expanding the grounds of review by contract is simply a choice
of procedure as opposed to an expansion of the courts' jurisdiction.
The American Arbitration Association and the United States Council for
International Business supported the respondent, arguing that expanding
judicial review would result in the loss of the element of finality of arbitration
decisions. They also argued that such a finding would go against the plain
meaning of the FAA and that it would open the floodgates and strain judicial
5. Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel Inc., 113 F.App'x 272,273 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2003)).
6. Hall Street, 113 F.App'x at 273.
7. Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel Inc., 196 F.App'x 476, 477 (9th Cir. 2006).
8. Hall Street, 113 F.App'x at 273; Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925,930 (10th Cir.
2001).
9. Gateway Technologies Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir.
1995); Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cit. 1997).
10. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
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resources. They also offered the contention that since other leading
jurisdictions limit the grounds for judicial review, the United States would
become a less attractive forum for arbitration.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision placed considerable emphasis on the
literal text of the FAA. The Court held that the grounds for vacatur and
modification set out in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA are the exclusive grounds
for review by virtue of section 9, which states that "the court must grant such
an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in
sections 10 and 11 of this title"[emphasis added]." In focusing on the
language of section 9, the Court determined that it provides for no flexibility;
rather, section 9 of the FAA
unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except
when one ofthe "prescribed" exceptions applies. This does not sound
remotely like a provision meant to tell a court what to do just in case
the parties say nothing else.12
Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see the three
provisions, §§9-11, as substantiating a national policy favoring
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any
other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary
appeals that can "rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a
more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process"...
and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process.13
The Supreme Court did not differentiate between contractually expanding
or limiting rights of review in an arbitration agreement. Rather, the Court
rejected any modification of the grounds of review set out in sections 10 and 11
of the FAA.
The intervenors on behalf of Hall Street argued that parties will flee
arbitration if expanded review is not permitted, whereas one of the intervenors
on behalf of Mattel argued that parties will flee the courts if expanded review
is permitted. The Court gave little weight to these arguments, stating that
"whatever the consequences . . . the statutory text gives us no business to
expand the statutory grounds."' 4
Despite the strict adherence to sections 10 and 11 of the FAA, the Court
recognized that the FAA is not the only way in which parties can have arbitral
11. Federal Arbitration Act § 11, 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 9(1947).
12. Hall Street Assocs., 170 L. Ed. 2d at 264.
13. Id. at 265.
14. Id. at 266.
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awards reviewed. The Court pointed to state statutes and the common law as
other means of having courts review arbitral awards. The Court outlined that
the holding of this case applies only to parties taking advantage of the expedited
judicial review under the FAA. In the end, the decision was remanded to the
Ninth Circuit for consideration of other issues.
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority for ignoring the historical
context in which the FAA was passed. Justice Stevens maintained that the core
purpose of the FAA is to favor the enforceability of fairly negotiated arbitration
agreements, stating that section 2 of the FAA makes written arbitration
agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." He went on to state that
reliance on the literal text of the FAA "is flatly inconsistent with the overriding
interest in effectuating the clearly expressed intent of the contracting parties."' 5
Ill. CANADIAN CASE LAW ON VARYING GROUNDS OF REVIEW
In Canada, very few court decisions have considered whether parties to an
international arbitration agreement can contractually vary the statutory grounds
for judicial review of an arbitral award.
In Canada's common law jurisdictions, the international arbitration
statutes are Model Law 16 statutes. There are separate domestic arbitration
statutes that in some cases deal differently with rights of appeal and review. In
Quebec, arbitration provisions are contained in the Civil Code, with a provision
for the Model Law to be considered in international arbitration.
Those few Canadian court decisions on the subject of varying grounds of
review in international arbitration have considered the question of limiting the
grounds as opposed to expanding them.
A. Food Services ofAmerica, Inc. v. Pan Pacific Specialties Ltd (British
Columbia)
In Food Services ofAmerica, Inc. v. Pan Pacific Specialties Ltd,7 a 1997
decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court, a trial-level court, the parties
included a clause in their international arbitration agreement in which they
"expressly waive any entitlement they have or may have to rely upon" the
statutory grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement of an international
arbitral award. 8
15. Hall Street Assocs., 170 L. Ed. 2d at 268 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. See UNITED NATIONS, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/mil-arb/06-54671 Ebook.pdf
(last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
17. Food Services of America Inc. v. Pan Pacific Specialties Ltd., (1997), 32 B.C.L.R. (3d) 225
(B.C.S.C. Mar. 24, 1997).
18. Id. 110.
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Section 36 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act of British
Columbia (BC ICAA), a Model Law statute, provides the grounds upon which
a party may oppose recognition and enforcement of an international arbitration
award in British Columbia, as follows:
Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement
36 (1) Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective
of the state in which it was made, may be refused only
(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party
furnishes to the competent court where recognition or enforcement is
sought proof that
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity,
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication of that law, under
the law of the state where the arbitral award was made,
(iii) the party against whom the arbitral award is invoked was not
given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the
arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present the party's
case,
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration may be recognized and enforced,
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement ofthe parties or, failing any
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the state where the
arbitration took place, or
(vi) the arbitral award has not yet become binding on the parties or
has been set aside or suspended by a court of the state in which, or
under the law of which, that arbitral award was made, or
(b) if the court finds that
(i) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of British Columbia, or
(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the arbitral award would be
contrary to the public policy in British Columbia.
(2) If an application for setting aside or suspension of an arbitral
award has been made to a court referred to in subsection (1) (a) (vi),
the court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it
considers it proper, adjourn its decision and may also, on the
[Vol. 14:2
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application of the party claiming recognition or enforcement of the
arbitral award, order the other party to provide appropriate security.'9
Section 36 of the BC ICAA is essentially the same as Article 34 of the
Model Law (application for setting aside as exclusive recourse against arbitral
award).20
The respondent in Food Services did not argue that a waiver was not
permitted. Rather, it submitted that the waiver applied only where the
arbitration was conducted strictly in accordance with the International
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, the rules under
which the arbitration agreement required the arbitration to be conducted. The
Supreme Court of British Columbia held that if that were the case, there would
be no need to make use of Section 36, rendering the waiver useless.
The court did not discuss whether a waiver was possible. Implicitly it
accepted that it was possible and discussed the respondent's submission, stating
that "[i]t would not be appropriate for a court to go beyond the clear meaning
of the words in an arbitration agreement and interpret them in such a way as to
render the clause meaningless."'"
B. Noble China Inc. v. Lei (Ontario)
The 1998 decision of the Ontario Court (General Division) (now the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice) in Noble China Inc. v. Lei22 upheld a
settlement agreement arbitration clause in which the parties contractually
limited the grounds of judicial review of the arbitral award. The agreement
provided: "No matter which is to be arbitrated is to be the subject matter of any
court proceeding other than a proceeding to enforce the arbitration award."23
The arbitration was governed by the Ontario International Commercial
Arbitration Act (Ontario ICAA), a Model Law statute.24 The respondent Lei
moved unsuccessfully to set aside the award under Article 34 of the Model Law
(grounds for setting aside an arbitral award).25 In summary, the court concluded
that:
(a) Article 19 of the Model Law (determination of rules of
procedure), as incorporated into the Ontario ICAA, permits parties to
19. International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 233, § 36 (1996).
20. See International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C., ch.233, § 34 (1996).
21. Food Services, 32 B.C.L.R. (3d) 15.
22. Noble China Inc. v. Lei, (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 69, 87 (Ont. Gen. Div. Nov. 4, 1998).
23. Id. at 73.
24. Ontario International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 1.9 (1990).
25. Noble China, 42 O.R. (3d) at 96.
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agree on the rules of procedure for their arbitration, except in the case
of mandatory provisions of the Model Law (for example, Article 18,
equal treatment of parties required) or where the procedure would be
contrary to public policy;
(b) Contrary to the respondent's submission, Article 34 is not a
mandatory provision of the Model Law out of which parties cannot
contract; and
(c) The agreement not to resort to the courts was part of the permitted
procedural agreement of the parties.26
As a result, "[t]he rules to which they agreed exclude recourse to the
courts except to enforce an award."27 The court noted that the Ontario domestic
arbitration statute expressly prohibits parties from contracting out of the
comparable "setting aside an award" provision, which the Ontario ICAA does
not do.28
The court's judgment analyzes how to determine which articles of the
Model Law are mandatory and which are not. The court held that all articles
that are not discussed in the Commentary29 with mandatory language (i.e.,
words such as "may" as opposed to "shall") are not mandatory and can be
derogated from.3" The court noted that the Commentary to Article 34 states that
"[p]aragraph (2) lists the various grounds on which an award may be set
aside., 31 The court held that Article 34 is not a mandatory provision.32
C. The Parties Cannot Confer Appellate Jurisdiction
In Hall Street, one argument against permitting parties to expand the scope
of court review of arbitral awards is grounded in the reasoning that parties
should not have the ability to contractually agree that the courts will have
greater jurisdiction than the FAA provides.3
An indication of the way Canadian courts might react can be found in the
2004 decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Brent v. Brent.34 The
arbitration agreement did not purport to vary the scope ofjudicial review of the
26. Id. at 87, 90, 92, 93-94.
27. Id. at 88.
28. Id. at 88-89.
29. See The Secretary-General, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on
International CommercialArbitration, deliveredto the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264 (Mar. 25,
1985) [hereinafter Commentary].
30. Noble China, 42 O.R. (3d) at 90.
31. Noble China, 42 O.R. (3d) at 90-91 (quoting Commentary, supra note 25, at 72) (emphasis
added).
32. Noble China, 42 O.R. (3d) at 94.
33. Hall Street, 113 F.App'x at 273 (citing Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 994).
34. See Brent v. Brent, (2004), 69 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A. Feb. 17, 2004).
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award. However, it did purport to allow an appeal (on questions of law)
directly to the Court of Appeal, contrary to the scheme in the domestic
arbitration statute for appeals from awards to go to the Superior Court (and only
on specified grounds), with a limited further appeal right, with leave, to the
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that it is a statutory court, with its
jurisdiction defined by statute.35 It has no original jurisdiction to hear an appeal
from an arbitration award and the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on it.36
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion in Hall Street that parties cannot
expand the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards was based squarely on
the language in the relevant provisions of the FAA. The Court held that the
grounds for vacatur and modification set out in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA
are the exclusive grounds for review by virtue of section 9, which states that
"the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title".
The Ontario court's reasoning in Noble China was that the judicial review
provision in Article 34 of the Model Law is not a mandatory provision out of
which parties cannot contract. That reasoning is closer in spirit to Justice
Stevens' reasoning in his minority opinion in Hall Street that the core purpose
of the FAA is to favor the enforceability of fairly negotiated arbitration
agreements.
It remains to be seen whether Canadian appellate courts will endorse the
approach of the trial level courts in Ontario and British Columbia that permitted
parties to contractually limit courts' rights of review of arbitral awards.
However, at least on the basis of on Canadian court decisions to date, it can be
said that the FAA and the Model Law took opposite approaches to the ability
of parties to expand the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards: the FAA
precludes the parties from doing so while the Model Law appears to permit
them to do so.
35. Id. at 740.
36. Id.
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